Consider absolute-level satisficing consequentialism: ALSC: “There is a number, n, such that: An act is morally right iff either (i) it has a utility of […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
The "recognitional view" of practical rationality – as I shall use the term – is the view that all requirements of practical rationality are justified […] Read More
I’m sympathetic to the following view, which I call moral rationalism: MR: If S is morally required to do x, then S has decisive reason […] Read More
I greatly admire the work of Harry Frankfurt. More recently, he has argued that love and caring, in the form of volitional necessities, are the […] Read More
I’m an editor for Blackwell’s International Encyclopedia of Ethics, and my current (and first) task is to help make sure the IEE will have the […] Read More
In the previous post, I applied Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to argue for the claim that there must be some moral truths that cannot be known. […] Read More
Intuitively, it’s clear that ‘wrong’ entails ‘ought not’; and the term ‘right’ seems simply to be the contradictory of ‘wrong’ (after all, ‘It’s not right’ […] Read More
As I understand it, an obligation dilemma exists where an agent faces a choice situation in which two (or more) of her available act alternatives […] Read More
Geoff Sayre-McCord chatting about free will, metaethics, and stuff HERE.